Ouch! That Really Hurts. Pain Management in the Elderly and Terminally Ill: Is This a Legal or a Medical Problem? by McIntire, Timothy
City University of New York Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 2
Fall 2003
Ouch! That Really Hurts. Pain Management in the
Elderly and Terminally Ill: Is This a Legal or a
Medical Problem?
Timothy McIntire
University of Memphis
Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
The CUNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more information please contact
cunylr@law.cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Timothy McIntire, Ouch! That Really Hurts. Pain Management in the Elderly and Terminally Ill: Is This a Legal or a Medical Problem?, 6
N.Y. City L. Rev. 151 (2003).
Available at: 10.31641/clr060205
OUCH! THAT REALLY HURTS.
PAIN MANAGEMENT IN THE ELDERLY AND
TERMINALLY ILL:  IS THIS A LEGAL OR A
MEDICAL PROBLEM?
Timothy McIntire*
Early one Monday morning, you find Dr. A., your friend, som-
berly waiting in your office.  Your secretary comments that Dr. A. is
quite upset and has been pacing around the office for a while.  As
you exchange greetings with Dr. A., Dr. A. relates a horrible story
to you.  Dr. A. has been treating a patient suffering from extraordi-
nary chronic pain due to cancer.  In short, the pain persists, de-
spite the fact that Dr. A. has been medicating the patient with large
doses of morphine around the clock.  Dr. A. would like to increase
her patient’s morphine dose in an attempt to alleviate the pain, but
she fears both civil liability and possible criminal consequences
should anything go wrong with her patient and asks you what she
should do.  So, how do you advise your friend, Dr. A.?
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, society’s debate concerning physician-assisted
suicide has exposed the problem of inadequate pain management
for the elderly and the terminally ill.1  Specifically, medical studies
since the early 1990s have highlighted the problem of under-medi-
cation in elderly and terminally ill patients.2  On one hand, the
paradox of a dying patient suffering from excruciating pain despite
the latest technology modern medicine offers raises both ethical
and legal issues for today’s physicians and attorneys.  On the other
hand, society has spent countless hours and resources rehabilitat-
* J.D., 2003, The University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law;
M.B.A., 1991 Lincoln University; M.D., 1983 Louisiana State University Medical
Center in New Orleans. Dr. McIntire is also board certified in anatomic pathology,
clinical pathology, hematology, and medical management.  He is an associate in the
health law department of the Nashville, Tenn. office of Baker, Donelson, Bearman,
Caldwell & Berkowitz.  He is the honorable mention winner of the ABA/FJC Law and
Aging Student Essay Competition.
1 See Chris Stern Hyman, Pain Management and Disciplinary Action: How Medical
Boards Can Remove Barriers to Effective Treatment, 24 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 338 (1996); see
also Tyche Hendricks, Skimping on Elderly’s Pain Drugs “Like Torture,” THE SAN FRAN-
CISCO CHRONICLE, May 4, 2001, at A1.
2 Hyman, supra note 1, at 338; see also Hendricks, supra note 1.
151
152 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:151
ing narcotic addicts and combating the war on drugs.  This dy-
namic tension between inadequately medicating patients suffering
from chronic pain and the need to control narcotic availability to
fight addiction has put pain management in the forefront of
medicine and law.
Addressing pain management in the elderly and the termi-
nally ill is important to attorneys for two reasons.  First, physicians
often do not adequately treat the pain of dying patients due to a
legitimate fear of state medical board discipline from over-medi-
cating patients with pain symptoms.  Second, attorneys think first
of medical malpractice remedies and have not often used the con-
cept of elder abuse as a legal theory to hold physicians responsible
for the inadequate treatment of pain in elderly and terminally ill
patients.  Both of these precedents appear to be changing.
The medical community has long indoctrinated its physicians
with caution in the use of narcotic therapy for pain relief.3  As this
article will outline, however, the medical community is slowly rec-
ognizing its deficiencies in treating patients with chronic pain.  In
short, medical societies and state licensing boards are slowly adapt-
ing their mores, regulations, and policies to allow for adequate
pain relief in the elderly and the terminally ill.4
Changes in medicine, nevertheless, occur slowly, and it is
often only through judicial encouragement that the needed medi-
cal changes occur.  For instance, an increasing number of elderly
and terminally ill patients are afforded more effective pain relief as
a result of the medical community’s fear of legal liability, which has
led to the voluntary adoption of more aggressive pain management
policies.  This article suggests that, at least in some states, a careful
use of elder abuse statutes as quasi-medical malpractice provisions
could help ensure that elderly and terminally ill patients receive
adequate pain relief.
Attorneys who understand the historical and current medical
concepts involving pain management in the terminally ill may bet-
ter assist their clients in evaluating any legal rights or remedies they
may have when physicians refuse to address the need for pain man-
agement in the elderly and terminally ill.  To that end, this article
3 Ann M. Martino, In Search of a New Ethic for Treating Patients with Chronic Pain:
What Can Medical Boards Do? 26 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 332, 337 (1998) (“From the min-
ute I entered medical school to the day I finished my residency, I had it drilled into
my head that narcotics should be used sparingly (if ever). We spent hours listening to
professors describe how patients will do anything to get their doctors to prescribe
narcotics and not more than a minute or two discussing their therapeutic uses.”).
4 See infra Part V.
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first will address the medical concept of pain, next it will survey
some of the judicial decisions that have influenced the emerging
trend of holding physicians responsible for their medical decisions
outside of the traditional medical malpractice arena, and finally,
the article will describe some of the evolving changes in physician
and state medical licensing board attitudes regarding the aggres-
sive treatment of pain in the elderly and terminally ill.
I. PAIN RELIEF:  A CRIME OR A DUTY
Physicians often struggle to balance their role in limiting nar-
cotics to patients who suffer with drug addictions and liberally dis-
pensing narcotics to patients with significant chronic pain.  These
conflicting pain management situations provide a constant source
of turmoil and legal liability for physicians.  In addressing this tur-
moil, attorneys should recognize the opportunities and liabilities
physicians face when prescribing narcotics for pain.  For example,
one-half of patients suffering from chronic pain syndromes have
extreme difficulty performing the normal activities of life and can-
not control their pain with any medication other than narcotics.5
Additionally, while physicians’ ability to manage cancer pain has
improved, adequate pain relief continues to elude many dying pa-
tients.6  For instance, a 1998 study performed by the Eastern (U.S.)
Cooperative Oncology Group showed that over one-half of the pa-
tients receiving pain medication judged their pain relief to be inad-
equate.7  Curiously, there is no adequate explanation of why, in the
era of modern medicine in which we live today, terminally ill pa-
tients must die in excruciating and unrelieved pain.8
To better understand the conflicts physicians have regarding
the under-medication of patients suffering from painful terminal
illnesses, one must recognize the problem of abusing such pre-
5 Interview with Neil Ellison, M.D., Overcoming Obstacles to Pain Management, PAIN.
COM, A WORLD OF INFORMATION ON PAIN, at http://www.pain.com/cancerpain/cp_
int_ellison.cfm (last visited Sept. 23, 2003) (on file with the New York City Law Re-
view). The opioids family of narcotics includes codeine, oxycodone (i.e., oxycontin)
and morphine.
6 Neil M. Ellison, M.D. et al., The Ongoing Challenges of Pain Control, PAIN.COM, A
WORLD OF INFORMATION ON PAIN, at http://www.pain.com/articles/onepage.cfm?
chapter_id=75 (last visited Sept. 23, 2003) (on file with the New York City Law
Review).
7 Id.
8 See id. (stating that barriers to pain relief include patients’ poor compliance with
prescribed medication, patients underestimating and mischaracterizing their pain to
physicians, patients’ and physicians’ concerns about narcotic addiction, and poor phy-
sician understanding of both the amount of pain their patients are suffering and the
best treatment for such pain).
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scription drugs in society.  Oxycontin provides a recent example of
this conflict.9  On the one hand, oxycontin can be taken orally and
provides rapid and highly efficient pain relief, thus negating the
need for inconvenient and painful injections.10  Physicians under-
prescribing oxycontin may be accused of not being sensitive to
their patients’ pain conditions.  On the other hand, oxycontin has
a tremendous potential for abuse as an illegal street drug, and phy-
sicians overprescribing oxycontin run the risk of both civil and
criminal liability, as well as state licensure sanctions.
So, where is the balance?  Chronic pain patients need narcotic
relief, but narcotics, like oxycontin, have always carried both risks
to the patient and adverse consequences to society.  Horribly, 117
people in 31 states during the last two years died from the illegal
use of oxycontin, graphically illustrating its potential for abuse.11
Testifying before a House appropriations subcommittee, DEA Ad-
ministrator Asa Hutchison agreed with several representatives on
the subcommittee that the street abuse of oxycontin is a national
emergency that needs to be curtailed, but with every curb comes
physician hesitance in using narcotics to treat chronic pain in the
elderly.12
Further efforts to control the abuse of oxycontin are also
found in the courts.  For instance, in February 2002, a Florida jury
convicted a physician of manslaughter in the deaths of four pa-
tients for whom he prescribed oxycontin for chronic pain relief.13
This Florida physician is believed to be the nation’s first physician
to stand trial on manslaughter or murder charges in the oxycontin
9 Oxycontin II is an opioid agonist and a Schedule II control substance with an
abuse liability similar to morphine. Oxycontin tablets are a controlled-release oral
formulation of oxycodone hydrochloride indicated for the management of moderate
to severe pain when a continuous, around-the-clock analgesic is needed for an ex-
tended period of time. Oxycodone can be abused in a manner similar to other opioid
agonists, legal or illicit.  This should be considered when prescribing or dispensing
oxycontin in situations where the physician or pharmacist is concerned about an in-
creased risk of misuse, abuse, or diversion. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma, Thousands of
Counterfeit Oxycontin Tablets Seized by U.S. Customs Service (Dec. 4, 2002), at http://www.
purduepharma.com/pressroom/news/oxycontinnews/20021204-01.htm (on file with
the New York City Law Review).
10 Id.
11 Lawmakers: Oxycontin Maker Failing to Curb Abuse, USA TODAY, Dec 20, 2001, at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/addiction/2001-12-12-oxycontin.htm (on file
with the New York City Law Review).
12 See id.
13 Oxycontin Doctor Convicted in Oxycontin Deaths, JOIN TOGETHER ONLINE, Feb. 21,
2002, at http://www.jointogether.org/sa/news/summaries/reader/0,1854,548406,
00.html (on file with the New York City Law Review).
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death of a patient.14  But before concluding that this physician be-
longs in jail, one must recognize that he worked in two different
“pain management” clinics providing care for many patients who
could not find relief elsewhere in the medical community.15  As-
suming he is found guilty of illegally and recklessly prescribing oxy-
contin, what type of chilling effect will this case have on other
physicians who legally prescribe pain medication for their termi-
nally ill patients?  Many physicians may stop treating terminally ill
patients, finding the risk of potential investigation and prosecution
too great to assume.  So how does one counsel a physician who
treats elderly or terminally ill patients?  Will traditional concerns of
narcotic addiction, medical licensure discipline, and illegal street
narcotics be the greatest barrier to real-time and adequate pain re-
lief for elderly or terminally ill patients?
II. TO MEDICATE, OR NOT TO MEDICATE:  WHAT AN ATTORNEY
MUST KNOW
A. A Physician’s Slant on Narcotics
Physicians are seen as healers, preservers of life and relievers
of suffering.16  In modern life, however, these roles may conflict.
Because of the fear of narcotic addiction, pain management in the
elderly and the terminally ill presents particular challenges for phy-
sicians and society.17  Although physicians are often very cautious
in their use of narcotics, a balance must be forged between the
need for adequate pain relief in the elderly and the terminally ill
and the concern for patients’ misuse of prescribed narcotics.
Two sentinel reports highlight the medical community’s con-
cern about prescription drug abuse.  First, a 1980 White House
Conference on Prescription Drug Abuse extensively chronicled the
public’s misuse of narcotics.18  A decade later, the White House
Office of National Drug Control Policy quantified the problem by
estimating that about one-third of all emergency-room-treated,
drug-related deaths were from prescription drugs.19  In light of
these statistics, it is not unreasonable for physicians to be cautious
14 Id. See also infra Part IV for additional descriptions of criminal charges involving
physicians and non-oxycontin homicide.
15 Oxycontin Doctor Convicted in Oxycontin Deaths, supra note 13.
16 Kansas v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 213 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
17 See id. at 214.
18 Bonnie B. Wilford et al., An Overview of Prescription Drug Misuse and Abuse: Defin-
ing the Problem and Seeking Solutions, 22:3 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 197 (1994).
19 Id. at 198. One may speculate that the other two-thirds of emergency-room-
related drug deaths were from street drugs.
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in prescribing narcotics.  Attorneys with clients suffering from
chronic pain, however, cannot afford to have physicians act so cau-
tiously.  Despite the statutory obligations, medical training, medical
ethics, and customs that often impose restraints on a physician’s
ability to prescribe narcotics, attorneys must be able to assure phy-
sicians that the legal process will protect them from harm if physi-
cians aggressively treat the pain in their elderly or terminally ill
patients.20  For instance, physicians have been taught to continually
assess the severity of their patients’ symptoms, the patients’ reliabil-
ity in taking the narcotics as directed, and the possibility that alter-
native medications may provide equivalent pain relief.21  The
stigma and consequences to a physician for even innocently assist-
ing a patient in becoming addicted to his or her medication may
be significant. Further, a physician’s aggressive use of narcotics for
pain relief may raise issues with state medical licensing boards or
hospital peer review committees, may affect the physician’s reputa-
tion in the community, or may subject the physician to unwanted
civil or criminal liability.  As a result of these potential conse-
quences, physicians have been trained to be cautious in prescribing
narcotics, even when the use of such medication fits soundly within
prudent medical judgment.22  By advocating for clients suffering
from chronic pain and encouraging physicians not to fear civil or
criminal liability for under-medicating elderly or terminally ill pain
patients, attorneys may play a significant role in the solution of
their clients’ problems of inadequate pain relief.
Attorneys should understand that scientific investigations have
negated the myth that the typical abuser of prescription narcotics
is a patient whose doctor introduced the drug to him or her during
medical treatment.23  In fact, research finds that persons who
abuse prescription narcotics are often also abusing illicit street
drugs.24  Conversely, most medical patients appropriately use pre-
scription narcotics for medical ailments and do not exhibit abusive
tendencies.25  In light of these findings, both attorney and physi-
cian education as to the decreased risks of narcotic abuse and the
benefits of aggressive pain management in the elderly and the ter-
minally ill becomes important.  Attorneys should see that physi-
cians not only provide adequate pain relief to their clients, but also
20 Id. at 200.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 199.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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assess the legal implications of potential claims regarding abuse in
their elderly or terminally ill clients who do not receive adequate
pain care.  But, as will be explained in Part II, on the section on
palliative care, the price of pain relief in the elderly and the termi-
nally ill is not without controversy.
B. An Attorney’s Slant on the Physician’s Slant
Traditionally, physicians divide pain into two main catego-
ries:26 (1) acute pain that may result from surgery, burns, or
trauma,27 and (2) chronic pain from either cancer or non-cancer
diseases.  The primary cure for cancer pain is the treatment of the
underlying malignancy, which is often the source of or a contribut-
ing factor to the pain.  Secondary treatments for cancer pain in-
clude direct symptomatic relief of the pain with medications.28
Non-cancer pain, however, is often more complex because there
may not be adequate therapies to treat the underlying illness.  In
cases of chronic illness, pain management plays an important
role.29
The adequate treatment of pain30 in the terminally ill patient
is essential in minimizing or alleviating suffering, yet physicians in
the United States have only recently begun to address this issue.
For almost 30 years, the medical community has recognized the
inadequate and under-treatment of pain in hospitals and long-term
care facilities.31  Throughout this time, the population has contin-
ued to age and the need for adequate health care has never been
more important.  Society and the law are now more aggressively
addressing this problem because under-treating pain results in
needless suffering by elderly and terminally ill patients.
To better understand this problem, attorneys must recognize
the reasons that physicians may be reluctant to aggressively treat
26 Barry R. Furrow, Pain Management and Provider Liability: No More Excuses, 29 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 28, 29 (2001).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 43 (Pain is defined as “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience
arising from actual or potential tissue damage or described in terms of such dam-
age.”). See also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2241.5 (2003) (Intractable pain, as seen in
the terminally ill and often addressed through the concept of palliative care, may be
described as “a pain state in which the cause of the pain cannot be removed or other-
wise treated and which in the generally accepted course of medical practice no relief
or cure of the cause of the pain is possible or none has been found after reasonable
efforts . . . .”).
31 Richard M. Marks, M.D. & Edward J. Sachar, M.D., Undertreatment of Medical In-
patients with Narcotic Analgesics, 78:2 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 173 (1973).
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the pain of their patients.  For example, most physicians are not
adequately educated in medical school about narcotics and proper
pain management.32  Consequently, uncertainty about the use of
narcotics breeds physician concerns about civil and criminal liabil-
ity for the inappropriate use of such pain therapy.33  In addition,
the fear of peer review sanctions affecting a physician’s medical
license or hospital privileges discourages any aggressive use of nar-
cotics in their medical practice.34  Finally, physicians have been re-
luctant to take risks with aggressive pain management in elderly
and terminally ill patients because historically there has been less
liability for undertreatment of pain.35
Attorneys must recognize that, all too often,  patients and phy-
sicians view pain as a necessary part of an illness.  Both patients and
physicians may share the attitude that pain should be endured and
that medication for pain relief should be used only in the rarest of
circumstances.36  For many young and otherwise healthy patients
with acute, short-lived illnesses, this medieval approach to the toler-
ance of pain may be loosely acceptable.  For elderly and terminally
ill patients, however, pain management should be aggressive and
tailored to their specific illness and situation.
C. What Elderly and Terminally Ill Patients Have to Say to Attorneys
and Physicians Alike
Palliative care is medical care whose primary purpose is to alle-
viate pain and suffering.37  More specifically, palliative care is the
prevention or treatment of pain, shortness of breath, and other
symptoms of terminally ill patients.38  Although the ethical princi-
ples of autonomy, beneficence, and non-malfeasance support the
concept of palliative care,39 many have described the practice of
palliative care and its aggressive pain management as having a
“double effect,” reasoning that in its efforts to relieve pain and suf-
fering, the amounts of pain medication used may have the effect of
32 Furrow, supra note 26, at 28.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 29.
37 See John M. Luce & Ann Alpers, Legal Aspects of Withholding and Withdrawing Life
Support From Critically Ill Patients in the United States and Providing Palliative Care to Them,
162 AM. J. RESPIR. CRIT. CARE MED. 2029 (2000).
38 Id.
39 Id.
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shortening one’s life.40
Interestingly, the rule of double effect describes an ethical
principal:  palliative care would be morally wrong if death was in-
tentionally caused, but it is permissible if death is foreseen but not
intended.41  Many ethicists often use this principle to explain why
certain forms of end-of-life-care that result in death are accept-
able.42  Having its roots in the Middle Ages, Roman Catholic moral
theologians adopted the rule of double effect in situations where a
person must decide whether one potentially harmful action is pref-
erable to another (death versus pain).43
Understanding palliative care requires one to recognize the
four elements that serve as the rule of double effect’s foundation.44
The first element concerns the nature of the act, which must be
beneficial, such as the relief of pain.45  The second element in-
volves the physician’s intention.46  Specifically, if both a good effect
(pain relief) and an evil effect (death) may result from the treat-
ment, only the good effect must be intended.47  Third, a distinc-
tion between the means and the effects must be present, for
example, the evil effect (death) must not be a means to the good
effect (pain relief).48  The fourth condition states that the net good
effect must outweigh the net evil effect.49  Obviously, in these in-
stances of the palliative care, the physician’s role as healer may
conflict with her role as a reliever of suffering when increasing
amounts of pain medication are needed to provide the patient
comfort care.50  Balancing these competing issues is often difficult
for the physician, the patient, and the patient’s family.
In an effort to address the legal issues concerning these end-
of-life treatment options, the U.S. Supreme Court in Washington v.
Glucksberg51 ruled that, while there is no constitutional right to phy-
40 See Timothy E. Quill et al., The Rule of the Double Effect – A Critique of Its Role in
End-of-Life Decision Making, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1768 (1997).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1769.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).  Justice Souter, in a concur-
ring opinion, described the acceptance of palliative care and noted the following state
statutes that authorize such end-of-life pain management: IND. CODE § 35-42-1-2.5 (a)
(1) (Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707A.3.1 (West Supp. 1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
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sician-assisted suicide, state statutes allowing palliative care are con-
stitutional.52  Highlighting the Court’s acceptance of palliative care
and providing the fifth vote necessary for a majority opinion, Jus-
tice O’Connor wrote that “[t]he parties and amici agree that in
these States a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and
who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining
medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering,
even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening
death.”53  She also emphasized that “[t]here is no dispute that dy-
ing patients in Washington and New York can obtain palliative
care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths.”54
In New York v. Quill, the Court further distinguished legal palli-
ative care from illegal physician-assisted suicide.55  Writing for the
majority in Quill, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that a doctor
who provides aggressive palliative care, even if it hastens a patient’s
death, has the same intent as a physician who withdraws life-sus-
taining medical treatment purposefully. Both physicians respect
their patients’ wishes by not subjecting them to futile and degrad-
ing procedures.56  The Chief Justice continued, “[j]ust as a State
may prohibit assisting suicide while permitting patients to refuse
unwanted lifesaving treatment, it may permit palliative care related
to that refusal, which may have the foreseen but unintended
‘double effect’ of hastening the patient’s death.”57
The Glucksberg and Quill opinions as well as new state laws per-
mitting palliative care in terminally ill patients with intractable pain
have contributed to a growing awareness in the legal and medical
communities that patients no longer need to accept the severe
pain of their illnesses without relief from medication.  As a result,
patients and their families have become more aggressive in assert-
§ 216.304 (Michie 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (3) (West Supp. 1997); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.11 (A)(6), 2133.12 (E)(1) (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-60-4
(Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37.1 (Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 752.1027 (3) (West Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 (b)(2) (1996). Id. at
780 n.15 (Souter, J., concurring).
52 This article does not address physician-assisted suicide; however, it is noteworthy
that the Court, in Washington v. Glucksberg, distinguished and affirmed the concept of
palliative care within the context of this constitutional challenge against a state ban
on physician-assisted suicide.
53 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737.
54 Id. at 737-38.
55 521 U.S. 793, 802 (1997). Note that the opinions in Glucksberg and Quill were
released at the same time. Both cases addressed the constitutionality of state laws
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide and had similar holdings.
56 Id. at 801-02.
57 Id. at 808, n.11.
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ing their right to pain relief and have begun to use nontraditional
legal theories to litigate their claims against doctors who do not
provide adequate pain management.   These new techniques in-
clude expanding the scope of medical malpractice and charging
physicians with elder abuse.
III. PAVING THE WAY FOR PAIN MANAGEMENT CLAIMS:
PRECEDENT CASES
The new pain management litigation follows the precedent set
by a number of recent cases that clarify and broaden physicians’
responsibilities and potential liabilities for their terminally ill pa-
tients.  In recent years, physicians have become increasingly likely
to face criminal charges for errors in treating terminally ill and
elderly patients, and the scope of offenses that can constitute neg-
lect has widened.58  This movement toward increased criminal and
civil liability for patient care is paving the way for new types of pain
management litigation.
In the 1983 case of Barber v. Superior Court, the California
Court of Appeals ruled that two physicians did not murder their
deeply comatose patient by withdrawing life-support measures.59
In Barber, the deceased underwent successful abdominal surgery,
but suffered cardiopulmonary arrest while in the post-operative re-
covery room.60  Although he was immediately revived, he remained
in a coma for several days.61  His physicians quickly realized that his
coma resulted from severe brain damage that left him in a persis-
tent vegetative state.62  After discussing the patient’s physical condi-
tion and his extremely poor prognosis with his family, the family
drafted a written request to remove all life-support machines.63  As
a result, the defendant physicians ordered the life-sustaining equip-
ment removed; shortly thereafter, the patient died.64
58 See Tanya Albert, Professional Issues: Malpractice or Murder?, AM. MED. NEWS, 10
Oct. 22-29, 2001, at 10.  The article notes cases where physicians were held criminally
liable for their treatment of patients. For example, an Ann Arbor, Mich., surgeon was
charged with three counts of second-degree vulnerable adult abuse for care he pro-
vided to two nursing home patients, and a Utah psychiatrist was charged with negli-
gent homicide and manslaughter for overmedicating five elderly patients in a way that
resulted in their deaths. See also Kansas v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 214 (describing the
criminal prosecution of a physician for using palliative care methods).
59 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
60 Id. at 486.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
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In a well-reasoned opinion, the California Court of Appeals
stated that “a murder prosecution is a poor way to design an ethical
and moral code for doctors who are faced with decisions concern-
ing the use of costly and extraordinary ‘life-support’ equipment.”65
The court further held that the family made an objective, informed
decision motivated by “love and concern for the dignity of their
husband and father.”66  As such, the court dismissed the murder
charges against the physicians.67
With the specter of criminal charges removed, the role of fam-
ilies and their physicians in the end-of-life care entered a new era.
Certainly an adverse holding in this case would have significantly
prolonged the end-of-life vegetative state in many patients, thereby
precluding their sense of dignity in death.
After dodging the jail cell in Barber, the medical community
again confronted criminal allegations in the 1994 New York case of
People v. Einaugler.68  This case, however, was very different from
Barber.  Dr. Einaugler was convicted of reckless endangerment and
willful violation of health laws arising from his negligent medical
treatment of an elderly nursing home patient with renal disease.69
Unlike the physicians in Barber, who had the family’s consent to
withhold care from a severely comatose patient, Dr. Einaugler’s
poor medical decisions and subsequent delay in treatment brought
about his conviction.70
Specifically, after admitting his patient into the nursing home
following a hospital stay, Dr. Einaugler “mistook the patient’s peri-
toneal dialysis catheter for a gastrostomy feeding tube and directed
that the patient be fed through the peritoneal dialysis catheter.”71
After infusing numerous feedings directly into the patient’s ab-
dominal cavity, the patient became severely infected.72  Although
Dr. Einaugler knew this infection could be rapidly fatal if not im-
mediately treated, he delayed the patient’s emergency transfer
from the nursing home back to the hospital for over 10 hours.73
The patient died a few days later from complications arising from
this infection.74  Evidence at trial proved substandard medical
65 Id.
66 Id. at 493.
67 Id.
68 208 A.D.2d 946 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
69 Id. at 946-47.
70 Id. at 947; see also Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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care.75 Dr. Einaugler was convicted of reckless endangerment be-
cause he “was aware of, and consciously disregarded, a substantial
risk of serious physical injury to the patient by delaying her transfer
to the hospital . . . .”76
When further examined, Dr. Einaugler’s conviction for willful
violation of health laws revolved around the statutory term of neg-
lect.  Neglect, as defined by the regulations of the New York State
Department of Health, results from the “failure to provide timely,
consistent, safe, adequate and appropriate services, treatment,
and/or care to a patient or resident of a residential health care
facility. . . . ”77  Realizing that it was expanding the traditional con-
cept of medical malpractice into the criminal arena, the court iron-
ically announced that “this case does not support the proposition
that medical professionals should fear the prospect of unwarranted
criminal prosecutions for honest errors of medical judgment.”78
The accuracy of this court’s proclamation is arguable.  Certainly,
such a decision fuels the growing trend to hold physicians account-
able for their medical decisions in both an expanding civil and
criminal arena.
Unfortunately, not all cases involving a dispute over “honest
errors in medical judgment” will be as clear as the Einaugler case.  It
is likely that Einaugler may affect future judicial rulings that extend
elder abuse statutes into the realm of traditional medical
malpractice.
IV. COUNT 1: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE; COUNT 2: ELDER ABUSE
AND NEGLECT
A. Tort v. Tort
While the criminal prosecutions of physicians for medically re-
lated decisions have been occasionally successful, the increasing
ability of plaintiffs to hold physicians responsible for traditional
medical malpractice errors by using nontraditional theories of lia-
bility has made the care and treatment of elderly and terminally ill
patients increasingly risky.  Liability insurance as a shield against
poor treatment decisions is no longer foolproof.  This trend has
both good and bad aspects.  As discussed earlier, regulating and
75 Id.
76 Id.; see also Einaugler v. Supreme Court, 109 F.3d 836, 839 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming
the district court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus and noting that Dr. Einaugler was
sentenced to 52 weekends of incarceration).
77 Einaugler, 208 A.D.2d at 947.
78 Id. at 948.
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even encouraging physicians to keep abreast of elderly and termi-
nally ill patients’ medical needs, specifically regarding pain treat-
ment, is a good thing.79  The downside, including less access to
care for the elderly and terminally ill, must also be addressed, pos-
sibly by affording physicians reasonable personal protection from
new and inventive torts that may replace traditional medical mal-
practice claims.80  The following two cases illustrate the emerging
trends in civil liability involving pain management and the care of
elderly and terminally ill patients.81
In 1990, quietly and ahead of its time, a North Carolina jury
found the Guardian Care nursing home liable for violations of
state division of facility services regulations concerning the inade-
quate pain control of a terminally ill cancer patient.  The jury
awarded $7.5 million in compensatory damages and $7.5 million in
punitive damages to the estate of Henry James.82  While suits
against nursing homes for poor care are not unique, this case may
be the first of its kind where a nursing home was held liable for
inadequate pain control.  In this case, although the physicians had
ordered adequate doses of morphine to be given every three hours
for Mr. James’ pain control, the nursing home’s staff regularly sub-
stituted a less powerful painkiller.83  Unfortunately, Mr. James was
in pain caused by his cancer for seven months before he died.84
In May 2001, a California jury in Bergman v. Chin, awarded $1.5
million (using elder abuse statutes and not the more conventional
medical malpractice statutes) to the family of an 85-year-old man
whose physician failed to treat him adequately for the pain his can-
cer caused prior to his death.85  The Bergman estate claimed that
79 See supra Part II.
80 The balancing of less access to care for the elderly and the terminally ill against
liability issues and tort reform is beyond the scope of this article.
81 Physicians are not unlike others who will avoid professional risk. The fear of a
physician risking criminal punishment (which also brings with it licensure revocation)
or personal liability for nontraditional civil judgments (because malpractice liability
policies may not cover intentional, reckless, or willful torts) will drive many physicians
to limit their medical practice to “low-risk” patients. Factoring in the often lower-than-
market reimbursement for nursing home and eldercare, the legal risk of caring for
the elderly and the terminally ill may come to outweigh the financial and professional
rewards of such care.
82 Tinker Ready, Family Wins $15 Million in Nursing-Home Suit, THE NEWS & OB-
SERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 27, 1990, at B2.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Nathalie White, Failure to Treat Pain, Novel Verdict Could Signal a New Brand of
Med-Mal Suit, LAWYER’S WEEKLY, Aug. 6, 2001, at B1. This verdict and the precedent it
establishes may be a “self-inflicted wound” by organized medicine. The Bergman case
began as a complaint to the California Medical Board, “which agreed the patient
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Dr. Chin was reckless in not prescribing enough medication to re-
lieve the pain from Mr. Bergman’s lung cancer complications.86
Commenting on the judgment, Dr. Allan Basbaum, a pain re-
searcher at the University of California, stated that the under-treat-
ment of pain is a widespread problem.87  “Many doctors are afraid
of losing their licenses for overprescribing narcotics.  Others take a
textbook approach rather than listening to what their patients are
telling them.  In both cases, the patient suffers unnecessarily.”88
While the Bergman case may send chills down the spines of
many physicians, three important points need to be made: (1) the
awareness of the under-treatment of pain in elderly and terminally
ill patients has been extensively chronicled in recent medical litera-
ture;89 (2) in 1994, the California Medical Board issued guidelines
encouraging physicians to be more prompt and aggressive in pro-
viding medications for pain;90 and (3) in 1997, the California legis-
lature approved the Pain Patient’s Bill of Rights, which grants
patients suffering from severe chronic intractable pain the right to
request painkillers of their choice.91  Despite these and similar
guidelines and statutes in several states, many physicians are reluc-
tant to use palliative care to treat the terminally ill.  The traditional
fear of licensure discipline, criminal sanctions, and hospital peer
review discipline are the main reasons for this reluctance.92  Fur-
thermore, this problem appears more prevalent with those physi-
should have had better palliative care but took no action against the doctor.” Id. at
B12. If the California Medical Board had even sent Dr. Chin a letter of reprimand,
this suit may not have been filed. See id.
86 Hendricks, supra note 1. Notably, a mens rea of recklessness, and not the tradi-
tional negligence as seen in medical malpractice, is required under the elder abuse
statutes. Id. at A16. Additionally, unlike the medical malpractice statutes, liability
under the elder abuse statutes allows for the recovery of punitive damages. Id. The
Oregon-based nonprofit organization of the Compassion in Dying Federation assisted
in both the filing of the complaint with the California Medical Board and the suit in
Alameda County. Id. The Compassion in Dying Federation is an advocacy group for
physician-assisted suicide and palliative care and may be an effective resource for legal
and research assistance. See id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See generally Symposium, Relieving Unnecessary, Treatable Pain for the Sake of Human
Dignity, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 1 (2001); Symposium, Legal and Regulatory Issues in Pain
Management, 26 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 265 (1998); Symposium, Appropriate Management of
Pain: Addressing the Clinical, Legal and Regulatory Barriers, 24 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 285
(1996).
90 Medical Board of California, Guidelines for Prescribing Controlled Substances for In-
tractable Pain, July 29, 1994 at http://www.medbd.ca.gov/consumerguidelines.htm
(on file with the New York City Law Review).
91 CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 2241.5 (West 2001).
92 Furrow, supra note 26, at 28.
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cians who may not be as familiar with sophisticated pain
management regimens in the terminally ill setting.93
As a consequence of the Bergman decision, and in recognition
of the reluctance of many physicians to aggressively treat pain in
the terminally ill, California recently enacted legislation requiring
physicians “who could encounter pain management and end-of-life
care issues to take 12 hours of continuing medical education clas-
ses on the topic to renew their medical licenses.”94  Many physi-
cians outside of California likely have the same fears and
reluctance to address pain management issues in the terminally ill.
It will be interesting to see how the national medical community
motivates itself to overcome these barriers to pain management;
the two most obvious choices of motivation include either volun-
tary education or the experience and fear of civil liability.  As more
states adopt pain management guidelines, the standard of care for
pain management in the elderly will become consistent through-
out both urban and rural America, all but forcing even the most
reluctant of physicians to offer aggressive pain management to
their terminally ill patients suffering from intractable pain.  During
this transition, it will be important for attorneys to understand how
elder abuse statutes and other nontraditional remedies may inter-
act with the medical pain management of the dying.
B. Elder Abuse v. Palliative Care: Will State Legislatures Find the
Balance?
Many states recognize elder abuse as a significant social prob-
lem needing legislative guidance.  For instance, the California leg-
islature expressly acknowledged that “elders and dependent adults
may be subjected to abuse, neglect, or abandonment and that the
state has a responsibility to protect such persons.”95  The legislative
mandate that arose from these findings sprang from a 1998 Califor-
nia Senate report highlighting more than 225,000 annual incidents
93 The author has observed that, generally, anesthesiologists, psychiatrists, and
oncologists appear to have more experience and sophistication in advanced pain
management, as compared to general internists and family practitioners.
94 Tanya Albert, California Requires Doctors Take CME in Pain Management, AM. MED.
NEWS, Nov. 19, 2001 at 9. The article notes that while many states mandate continuing
medical education to renew one’s medical license, California is the first state to re-
quire specific classes in pain management.  The article also points out that the Cali-
fornia Academy of Family Physicians met the mandatory classes with skepticism while
the American Academy of Pain Management said the bill was “well intended” and
supported the training. Id.
95 CAL. WELF. & INST. (Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act)
CODE § 15600(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
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of elder abuse, which reflected a 1,000% increase in reported elder
abuse from 1987 to 1997.96  Admittedly, only 23% of these 225,000
cases in 1997 arose from physical abuse; nevertheless, the rapid rise
of elder abuse cases during the previous decade compelled the Cal-
ifornia legislature to address this crisis with precision.97  In an ef-
fort first to measure the size of this elder abuse crisis and then, in
an attempt to manage this crisis, California enacted statutes regard-
ing: (1) the encouragement of health care providers, social service
workers, and community members to report suspected cases of
elder abuse; (2) the collection of information on the numbers of
victims, circumstances surrounding the acts, and other pertinent
information to help establish adequate services for these elderly
victims; and (3) the protection under law for those persons who
report suspected cases of elder abuse, so long as the report is with-
out malicious intent.98  States wishing to protect elderly citizens
from abuse will need to recognize similar goals regarding the mea-
surement and the management of this abuse problem when enact-
ing legislation.
Elder abuse is often defined in terms of abuse and neglect.  As
such, a typical state statute concerning elder abuse and neglect
may define these terms in two main ways.  First, some states charac-
terize elder abuse as either a willful act that is likely to cause physi-
cal, mental, or emotional harm to an elderly adult, or as the failure
to provide the services necessary, including health care services,
which a prudent caregiver would provide to an elderly adult in sim-
ilar circumstances.99  Second, states may also define elder abuse as
the willful physical abuse or gross neglect of an “impaired adult”
with resulting serious mental or physical harm that may be punish-
able as an aggravated assault.100  Accordingly, in Mack v. Soung, the
California Court of Appeals provides an example regarding elder
abuse liability arising from a physician’s willful act that caused
96 Id. § 15610.07 (citing Historical and Statutory Notes accompanying the statute).
97 Id. The balance of the report’s elder abuse cases include: fiduciary abuse (32%),
mental suffering (22%), and sexual abuse (3.8%). Id. Although one may think of
mental suffering in the elderly as elder abuse, the statute defines mental suffering as a
subset of general abuse, describing such mental suffering as “fear, agitation, confu-
sion, severe depression, or other forms of serious emotional distress . . . . ” Id.
§ 15610.53.
98 Id. § 15601(a)-(c).
99 The statutes of five generally representative states are surveyed in this section.
See generally ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-101 (Michie 2001); CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE
§ 15610 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 415.102(1), (15) (West 2002); N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 260.25, 260.30 (McKinney 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-117 (1995).
100 TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-119 (1995).
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physical harm to an elderly citizen.101  The court, straying from the
traditional negligence standard used in medical malpractice claims
and using a more complex recklessness standard, found a physi-
cian liable for violating the state’s elder abuse laws for concealing,
and then not treating, a nursing home patient’s bedsore.102
Physicians and attorneys alike should note that the liability for
elder abuse often involves the acts of a caretaker.  As such, many
statutes define a caretaker as an individual or institution who has
the responsibility for the care of an adult as a result of family rela-
tionship, or who has assumed the responsibility for the care of the
adult person voluntarily, or by contract, or agreement.103  Thus, it
is not inconceivable that, in light of a broad statutory definition of
a caretaker, many states might include physicians as caretakers in
the eyes of the law.  In this regard, a physician caretaker who pro-
vided inadequate pain management to an impaired adult that, in
turn, caused serious physical harm to that adult, could be held ac-
countable under both civil elder abuse laws and the criminal stat-
utes of aggravated assault.
A survey of specific state statutes and case law may be helpful,
however, prior to initiating an elder abuse action.  For example, in
Arkansas, abuse of an adult includes “any willful or negligent act
which results in neglect . . . unreasonable physical injury . . . and
failure to provide necessary medical treatment . . . or medical ser-
vices.”104  Further, the adult abuse statutes state that it is specifically
unlawful for “any person or a caregiver to abuse or neglect” an
adult.105  Conversely, while Tennessee recognizes many of the typi-
cal elder abuse statutes found in other jurisdictions, a monetary
recovery of damages against a physician when a Tennessee elder
abuse statute is violated may only be obtained through the use of a
101 See Mack v. Soung, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). The court in
Mack said, “recklessness, unlike negligence, involves more than inadvertence, incom-
petence, unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions but rather rises to a level of a
conscious choice of a course of action . . . with knowledge of the serious danger to
others involved in it.” Id. at 834 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102 Id. at 835.
103 See, e.g., supra note 99.
104 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-28-102 (Michie 1997) (codifying the legislative intent re-
garding the detection and correction of adult abuse).
105 Id. § 5-28-103(a) (Michie 2001). A caregiver includes “a related or unrelated
person . . . that has the responsibility for the protection, care, or custody of an endan-
gered or impaired adult as a result of assuming the responsibility voluntarily, by con-
tract, through employment, or by order of the court[.]” Id. § 5-28-101(2). “Person” is
not defined in this statute. See id. § 5-28-101. Both criminal and civil penalties apply to
such abuse. See id. §§ 5-28-103, 106.
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traditional medical malpractice claim.106  This does not, however,
preclude the victim of elder abuse from holding her physician re-
sponsible for his acts under the elder abuse statutes.  For example,
other than the civil money damages that can only be obtained via
the medical malpractice statutes, there are two important avenues
available to Tennessee clients in addressing complaints against
their physicians: (1) criminal remedies, and (2) state board of
medical examiners remedies (which may limit or revoke the physi-
cian’s license to practice medicine).107  As claims arising from the
lack of palliative care grounded in elder abuse statutes continue to
increase, the likelihood of claims involving traditional elder abuse
statutes and criminal sanctions will increase in all states.
For the protection of physicians and clients alike, many states
have adopted specific palliative care and intractable pain manage-
ment statutes or regulations.108  While the need to limit patient
narcotic abuse is still present, many states realize that this need
must be balanced with guidelines for the treatment of the elderly
and the terminally ill suffering from intractable pain.  Currently,
many states emphasize concerns involving narcotics in both the ad-
diction aspect and in the treatment of pain for the elderly and the
terminally ill.109  Such guidelines would help in establishing a legal
standard of care in the treatment of elderly and terminally ill pa-
tients suffering from intractable pain.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Model Recommendations for Physicians; A Checklist for Attorneys
In achieving the balance between limiting narcotic addiction
and adequately treating terminally ill patients, many state legisla-
tures and medical licensing boards have turned to the Pain & Pol-
icy Studies Group at the University of Wisconsin Comprehensive
Cancer Center (“Pain & Policy Group”) for recommendations on
specific policies relating to the treatment of pain in the elderly and
106 TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-120(g) & § 29-26-115.
107 Criminal remedies could include both the potential of a Class A misdemeanor
and aggravated assault. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-117 (1995) and TENN. CODE
ANN. § 71-6-119 (1995). For an example of a State Board of Medical Examiners’ disci-
plinary process, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-213-217 (2000).
108 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 780 n.51.
109 Pain & Policy Studies Group, University of Wisconsin Comprehensive Cancer
Center, Annual Review of State Pain Policies 2000, available at http://www.medsch.wisc.
edu/painpolicy/publicat/01ppsgar/execsum.htm; see, e.g., TENN. COMP. R. & REGS.
0880-2-.14 (2003).
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the terminally ill.110  Recognizing that quality medical care dictates
that patients have access to appropriate and effective pain relief,
the Pain & Policy Group highlighted the following issues:
(1) inadequate pain control may result from a physician’s lack
of sophisticated knowledge or experience in pain
management;111
(2) fear of investigations by federal, state, or local regulatory
agencies inhibit a physician’s comfort level in adequately
treating patients with intractable pain;112
(3) state medical boards have a responsibility to develop guide-
lines and policies which would allow physicians who treat
intractable pain to be adequately educated on current is-
sues in pain management, and not to fear discipline when
using such pain management appropriately;113 and
(4) in each case of pain management concerning intractable
pain, a physician should have fully evaluated the patient, de-
veloped a written treatment plan, obtained the patient’s in-
formed consent and agreement for treatment, conducted
periodic reviews of the treatment at responsible intervals to
assess the ongoing need of the narcotics, kept complete
medical records, obtained specialty consultation for addi-
tional evaluation and treatment when necessary, and com-
plied with the control substances laws and regulations.114
The adoption of these or similar recommendations by state
medical boards, along with physician education and legal enforce-
ment of such recommendations, would allow physicians to better
address their patients’ pain relief needs.115  Removing the fear of
110 Pain & Policy Studies Group, supra note 109.
111 Id. at App. A § II.
112 Id.
113 Id. Tennessee’s regulation (which is similar to regulations in California, Florida,
and New York concerning the “authority of physician[s] to prescribe for the treat-
ment of pain,” states that “[t]he treatment of pain, including intractable pain, with
dangerous drugs and controlled substances is a legitimate medical purpose when
done in the usual course of professional practice.” TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0880-2-.14
(6) (e) (1) (2003). Notably, this rule should eliminate any physician concern for disci-
pline when providing adequate palliative care. Potentially this rule could be used to
establish that a medical treatment plan fell below the standard of care for patients
needing palliative care when their physicians do not provide such care. States without
such rules or similar statutes do a disservice to their citizens who could benefit from
palliative care in that: (1) physicians may fear discipline for such aggressive pain man-
agement in elderly patients, and (2) a legal standard for end-of-life pain management
may be hard to measure.
114 Annual Review of State Pain Policies 2000, supra note 109 at App. A *2-3.
115 Pain and Policy Studies Group, University of Wisconsin, ACHIEVING BALANCE IN
FEDERAL & STATE PAIN POLICY: A GUIDE TO EVALUATION at Executive Summary (Sept.
2003), available at http://electra.biostat.wisc.edu/painpolicy/eguide 2003/index/
eguide 2003.pdf.  Alabama, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
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physician discipline is paramount in allowing for more appropriate
palliative care.  Additionally, such recommendations may reduce
the total number of legal claims for elder abuse and neglect, and
allow for a more consistent and accepted standard of care in the
pain management of elderly and terminally ill patients.  It is only
through recognition and enforcement of these and similar recom-
mendations that attorneys will force reluctant physicians to provide
relief for patients suffering from chronic pain.
B. Where Do We Go From Here?
The practice of medicine may, at times, be both conservative
and technologically complex.  In the backdrop of organ transplan-
tation, gene therapy, and biomedical sophistication, patients dying
in pain occurs too frequently.  While it is understandable that soci-
ety wants to limit the availability of narcotics in our culture of drug
abuse, a better understanding of the balance between narcotic ad-
diction and the relief of intractable pain in the elderly and the
terminally ill is needed.  Organized medicine and several state leg-
islatures have begun to address these issues, but grass-roots physi-
cian education and acceptance has been slow to ensure nationwide
compliance in palliative care.  With the U.S. Supreme Court’s ac-
knowledgement and approval of palliative care as acceptable in ter-
minally ill patients116 and with the growing use of nontraditional
medical malpractice claims where adequate pain relief is not sup-
plied to dying patients, state medical boards in general, and physi-
cians specifically, are on notice of society’s expectations in pain
management.  To defy these expectations, either through igno-
rance or fear of discipline, will encourage additional legal reme-
dies to ensure that the elderly and the terminally ill have the pain
relief they deserve.
As for your friend, Dr. A., physicians practicing pain manage-
ment are both needed by society and at risk from society.  Dr. A.
should discuss these pain issues with her patient and her patient’s
family, expressly document the plan of treatment in the medical
record, follow well established pain guidelines, such as the ones
cited from the University of Wisconsin, and keep her fingers
South Carolina, South Dakota and Utah have adopted in full the recommendations of
the Pain & Policy Study Group. Id. at Table 4. Arizona, Iowa, Maine, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Vir-
ginia have adopted the recommendations in part. Id. Approximately 20 states have
statutes regarding palliative care, and approximately 20 states have regulations con-
cerning palliative care. Id at Fig. 1.
116 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735, 737-38 (1997).
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crossed.  As organized medicine figures out what the rest of us al-
ready know — that pain hurts and that chronic pain really hurts —
the medical community will do a better job with pain management.
If organized medicine is slow to grasp this concept, however, attor-
neys will reinforce their clients’ right to adequate pain relief
through the courts.  Both the legal and medical systems should be
charged with finding the balance between fighting illegal drug
users and guarding against the negligence of undertreating a pa-
tient’s pain — not an enviable task.  Although it seems as though
fewer physicians will be criminally prosecuted for the practice of
medicine, the possibility of more physicians being held liable for
elder abuse and neglect remains a significant possibility.
